As 2025 draws to a close, the United States’ largest military mobilisation in the Caribbean in decades has become a defining symbol of a deeper shift in American grand strategy. The deployment of an aircraft carrier group, advanced fighter jets, submarines and amphibious forces to pressure Venezuela is not merely a regional coercive move. It coincides with the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals a decisive reorientation: renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere alongside a visible retreat from underwriting European security. Together, these developments underscore a larger transformation — the United States adjusting to a world no longer shaped by unchallenged American dominance.
The Caribbean Buildup: More Than Venezuela
On the surface, the military buildup targets Venezuela and the Maduro regime. However, its strategic meaning is far broader. The 2025 NSS explicitly identifies Latin America and the Caribbean as priority theatres, reviving the core logic of the Monroe Doctrine: excluding “outside powers” — a clear reference to China — from gaining strategic influence in the Americas.
This posture reflects a return to hemispheric consolidation. Historically, the United States secured its rise to global power by dominating its immediate neighbourhood before projecting influence abroad. In an era of tightening resources and rising rivals, Washington appears to believe that the Western Hemisphere is the one arena where geography, power asymmetry and historical precedent still allow near-uncontested primacy.
The Monroe Doctrine in a New Era
First articulated in the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine was less about isolationism and more about exclusion. Its 21st-century revival is shaped by China’s deepening economic footprint in Latin America through infrastructure projects, loans and trade partnerships. Unlike Cold War competition, China’s influence is largely commercial rather than military, but Washington increasingly sees economic penetration as a precursor to strategic leverage.
By reaffirming hemispheric dominance, the United States is choosing a more defensible line of competition. Policing distant regions indefinitely has become costlier and politically contentious, while consolidating influence closer to home promises strategic depth in a more constrained global environment.
Europe’s Diminishing Centrality
The same NSS that elevates the Western Hemisphere also downplays Europe’s importance. Since 1945, the United States has been Europe’s principal security guarantor, first against the Soviet Union and later through NATO expansion. Under President Donald Trump, however, this role has been openly questioned.
While burden-sharing remains a visible argument, the shift is fundamentally structural. The U.S. now confronts China — a rival whose economic scale and technological base far exceed those of past challengers. In this context, Europe is increasingly viewed as a strategic distraction, absorbing resources without decisively shaping the primary contest of the century.
The End of the Unipolar Moment
The recalibration reflects a broader reality: the post-Cold War unipolar moment has ended. The United States remains the most powerful state, but it no longer dictates outcomes alone. Russia, despite economic weakness, retains nuclear parity and geopolitical relevance, as demonstrated by its resilience after Crimea’s annexation and prolonged confrontation with the West. China, meanwhile, poses a far more systemic challenge. Its economy has crossed two-thirds of U.S. GDP and continues to grow faster, enabling sustained military modernisation.
These developments have exposed the limits of the so-called “rules-based order”, revealing that power, not norms alone, still shapes global outcomes.
Offshore Balancing and Strategic Selectivity
Faced with this environment, the Trump administration appears to be experimenting with offshore balancing. This